In many applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems, such as river games, polluted river games and sequencing games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are nonnegative), and there is some ordering on the set of the players. A totally positive game has a nonempty core. In this paper we introduce constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players which assign to every such a game a subset of the core. These solutions are based on the distribution of dividends taking into account the hierarchical ordering of the players. The Harsanyi constrained core of a totally positive game with ordered players is a subset of the core of the game and contains the Shapley value. For special orderings it coincides with the core or the Shapley value. The selectope constrained core is defined for acyclic orderings and yields a subset of the Harsanyi constrained core. We provide a characterization for both solutions.
Introduction
A situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, shortly TU-game. A solution on a class of TU-games assigns a payoff vector or set of payoff vectors (possibly empty) to every game in the class. The best-known single-valued solution is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) , the best-known set-valued solution is the core (Gillies, 1953) .
In many economic allocation problems there is some ordering on the set of players. In this paper we model such an ordering structure on the set of players by a directed graph, or digraph. In a game with ordered players, consisting of a game and a digraph, the payoff assigned to a player may depend on both the worths of the coalitions as well as the position of the player in the graph. In the spirit of the Harsanyi set (Vasil'ev (1978 (Vasil'ev ( , 1981 ; Vasil'ev and van der Laan (2002)) or selectope (Hammer et al. (1977) ; Derks et al. (2000) ), we consider solutions that are based on distributing the Harsanyi dividends (see Harsanyi, 1959 ) of a game. The Harsanyi set of a game is the set of those payoff vectors that are obtained by distributing the dividend of every coalition in any possible way among its members. An alternative definition of this set is given by the selectope, defined as the convex hull of all selectope vectors in which every dividend is fully assigned to one player of the corresponding coalition.
For games with ordered players we modify the Harsanyi set by requiring that when i and j are two players within a coalition and i is a predecessor of j in the digraph, the share of i in the dividend of that coalition is at least as high as j's share. Since this puts restrictions on the distribution of the dividends, this modified Harsanyi set is a subset of the Harsanyi set. Also the selectope is modified by only considering selectope vectors such that the dividend of a coalition is fully assigned to a player that does not have predecessors within the coalition. Although the Harsanyi set is equal to the selectope for a standard TU-game, their respective modified sets are different for a game with ordered players. However, for both solutions the modified set is always a subset of the Harsanyi set itself.
Many economic allocation problems result in so-called totally positive games, meaning that all dividends are nonnegative.
1 In this paper we restrict attention to this interesting class of games. For a totally positive game, the core equals the Harsanyi set (and thus is nonempty) and so both the modified Harsanyi set and the modified selectope are subsets of the core. We therefore refer to these solutions on the class of totally positive games with ordered players as the Harsanyi constrained core and the selectope constrained core solution, respectively. The Harsanyi constrained core is always nonempty and generalizes 1 Besides the examples discussed in Section 3, other examples are, e.g. auction games (see Graham et al. (1990) ), dual airport games (see Littlechild and Owen (1973) ), telecommunication games (see van den Nouweland et al. (1996) ) and queueing games (see Maniquet (2003) ).
both the core and the Shapley value. In particular, for any digraph the Shapley value of the game belongs to the Harsanyi constrained core and it is the unique element of this set if the digraph is complete. On the other hand, the Harsanyi constrained core equals the core when the digraph is empty. The selectope constrained core is always a subset of the Harsanyi constrained core and might be empty, but it is a non-empty subset when the digraph is acyclic. We show that both constrained core solutions satisfy the four well-known efficiency, null player, additivity and nonnegativity properties. Both solutions also satisfy a structural monotonicity property which reflects the ordering of the players within the digraph. Further the Harsanyi constrained core is characterized as the maximal solution (with respect to set inclusion) that satisfies these five properties. Replacing structural monotonicity by structural exclusion characterizes the selectope constrained core solution as the maximal solution satisfying these five properties. In case the digraph is a rooted directed tree and every coalition that is not connected in the tree has zero dividend, then the selectope constrained core is a singleton with the so-called hierarchical outcome of Demange (2004) as its unique element. As a special case of such games we consider the polluted river cost allocation problem as discussed in Ni and Wang (2007) .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss some preliminaries on TU-games and digraphs. In Section 3 we define the class of totally positive games with ordered players and introduce the two constrained core solutions. The characterization results are given in Section 4. In Section 5 we discuss the application of both solutions to rooted tree games and the polluted river cost allocation problem as a special case.
Preliminaries
A cooperative game with transferable utility, shortly TU-game, is a pair (N, v) , where N = {1, ..., n} is a finite set of n players, and v:
is the worth the members of coalition S can obtain by agreeing to cooperate. Since we take the player set N to be fixed, we represent a TU-game by its characteristic function v and we denote the collection of all TU-games on N by
if T ⊆ S, and u T (S) = 0 otherwise. It is well-known that for every TU-game v, there exist unique weights
are called the (Harsanyi) dividends of v, see Harsanyi (1959) . We denote the collection of all totally positive TU-games on N by G N + . For a collection G ⊆ G N of games, a set-valued solution F on G assigns a set
Examples of set-valued solutions are the core and the Harsanyi set (or selectope). The core (Gillies, 1953) 
As known, every convex game has a nonempty core and thus the core is nonempty on G N + . The Harsanyi set (Vasil'ev, 1978 , 1981 
obtained by distributing the dividend of any coalition T ∈ Ω N in any possible way among the players in T . For T ∈ Ω N , the set of sharing vectors p T ∈ IR N + is defined as
P be the collection of all sharing systems. Then every sharing system p = [p T ] T ∈Ω N ∈ P yields the corresponding Harsanyi payoff vector of game v given by
The Harsanyi set H(v) is the (nonempty) collection of all Harsanyi payoff vectors, thus
It should be noticed that the Harsanyi set of a game is equal to its selectope, introduced by Hammer et al. (1977) , see also Derks et al. (2000) . First, a selector chooses for every nonempty coalition a particular player in the coalition to whom to assign the dividend of that coalition, i.e., a selector is a function α:
The selectope vector corresponding to selector α and game v ∈ G N is the vector s
, and thus assigns the dividend of any nonempty coalition T fully to the 'selected' player α(T ). Then the selectope S(v) of v is the convex hull of all selectope vectors, i.e., 
Next, we give some notions on digraphs. A directed graph or digraph on a finite set of nodes N is a pair (N, D) where D ⊆ N × N is a binary relation on N . In this paper the nodes correspond to the players in the game, and the digraph (N, D) represents an ordering on the set N of players. Since we take the finite set N to be fixed, we represent
For D ∈ D N and i, j ∈ N , a path between i and j in D is a sequence of different
A digraph is acyclic if there are no cycles. An acyclic digraph represents some hierarchical ordering on the set of players. The collection of all acyclic digraphs on N is denoted by
there is no j ∈ N such that (j, i) ∈ D} denotes the set of top nodes in D, being the nodes not having a predecessor. Notice that T D ̸ = ∅ when D is acyclic. An acyclic digraph is a (rooted directed) tree if it has a unique top node i 0 and there is precisely one directed path from i 0 to every other node. Note that in a rooted directed tree every j ̸ = i 0 has precisely one predecessor. 
Definition 3.1 For every
(v, D) ∈ G N + × D N , the Harsanyi constrained core of (v, D) is the set HC(v, D) = { x ∈ IR N x = ∑ T ∈Ω N ∆ v (T )p T , p T ∈ P T D for any T ∈ Ω N } .
Example 3.2
We consider a special case of the river water allocation model of Ambec and Sprumont (2002) . A river flows through three countries, numbered by 1, 2 and 3 from upstream to downstream. We suppose that the flow at the source is e 1 = 1 and there are no other flows. We also suppose that countries 1 and 2 have no wish to consume water, but for country 3 every unit of water yields a monetary benefit of 3. Then the associated river game on N = {1, 2, 3} is given
Note that D reflects the principle of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty
(ATS), saying that a country has the property rights of the water inflow in its own area and has absolute sovereignty about the use of this inflow. On the other hand, D ′ is in accordance with the principle of Territorial Integration of all Basin States (TIBS), saying that all countries together are the legal owner of every inflow of water, irrespective of the country at which the inflow occurs (see Kilgour and Dinar (1995) for more details on these principles). Then we have
, and
See Figure (2002) is an extreme point of HC(v, D ′ ). Example 3.3 Next we consider a special case of the polluted river model of Ni and Wang (2007) . Again, a river flows through three countries, numbered by 1, 2 and 3 from upstream to downstream. But now the players face the problem to find a fair allocation of the costs to clean for pollution. With c i , i = 1, 2, 3, being the costs of cleaning the river on the territory of country i, Ni and Wang (2007) consider the DR polluted river game v given by
, denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , i}. This game reflects the Downstream Responsibility (DR) principle saying that cleaning the river at some territory is the responsibility of the player at that territory and all upstream players. Considering the order D = {(3, 2, (2, 1)}, the Harsanyi constrained core is obtained by assigning c 1 to player 1, c 2 to players 1 and 2
of which at least half to player 2, and assigning c 3 to all three players with shares satisfying p 3 ≥ p 2 ≥ p 1 . Taking c i = 1 for i = 1, 2, 3, yields
We discuss this example further in Section 5.2. 2 Example 3.4 As a third example we consider a special case of the one-machine sequencing situation as studied in e.g. Curiel et al. (1989) . Players 1, 2 and 3 are three jobs that are waiting to be processed on the same machine. The machine can only process one job at a time. Suppose that the processing times are q 1 = 1 and q 2 = q 3 = 2 and that each job has a constant unit waiting cost α 1 = α 2 = 2 and α 3 = 4. If in the initial queue job 1 is in front, after that job 2 and finally job 3, then the waiting costs are c 1 = 0, c 2 = 2 and c 3 = 12 with total costs C = 14. By a result of Smith (1956) , total costs are minimized by serving the jobs in non-increasing order of their urgency index
. Since u 1 = u 2 = 1 and u 3 = 2, this requires that job 3 is served first and then either job 1 or job 2, yielding total costs of 8. To answer the question how much compensation player 3, who is now served first, should pay to the others, Curiel et al. (1989) consider the sequencing game v = 4u {2,3} + 2u {1,2,3} , where the two dividends of the coalitions {2, 3} and {1, 2, 3} equal the cost saving obtained when switching the positions of the first and last player in these coalitions. Taking digraph D = {(1, 2), (2, 3)} reflecting the order in the initial queue, yields
Notice that the last extreme point is the Shapley value of v. 2
The Harsanyi constrained core HC(v, D) generalizes the Shapley value and the core for totally positive TU-games in the sense that it always contains the Shapley value and is a subset of the core of v, and for special digraphs these inclusions can be equalities. Let
Sh(v) ∈ HC(v, D). The inclusion HC(v, D) ⊆ core(v) follows immediately from the fact that H(v) = core(v) when v is totally positive, and P
Take v = u {i,j} and let e j ∈ IR N be given by e j j = 1 and e The second constrained core solution that we introduce is a modification of the selectope. Taking into account the ordering D, only selectors are considered such that the dividend of a coalition is assigned to a player that has no predecessors in the coalition. So, instead of A N , we only allow selectors in 
Axiom (Efficiency) For all (v, D) ∈ G
N + × D N , any payoff vector in the solution is effi- cient, i.e., ∑ i∈N x i = v(N ) for all x ∈ F (v, D).
Recall that a player
i ∈ N is a null player in v ∈ G N if v(S) = v(S \ {i}) for all S ⊆ N .
Axiom (Null player property) For all (v, D) ∈ G
satisfies x i = 0, whenever i is a null player in v.
Axiom (Additivity) For all v, w ∈ G
N + and D ∈ D N , it holds that F (v + w, D) = F (v, D) + F (w, D), where (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S) for all S ⊆ N .
Axiom (Nonnegativity) For all (v, D) ∈ G
N + × D N , any payoff vector x ∈ F (v, D) satisfies x i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N .
Characterization of the Harsanyi constrained core
The next axiom of structural monotonicity reflects the ordering of the players within the digraph. Taking account of their contributions in the game v as well as their positions in the digraph D, we require that, if a player i is necessary for one of its successors j, then i earns at least as much as j. 6 Player i is necessary for player j ∈ N \ {i} in game v if
e., i is necessary for j if the marginal contribution of j to any coalition not containing i is equal to zero.
Axiom (Structural monotonicity) For all (v, D) ∈ G
Structural monotonicity expresses that the arcs in the digraph D reflect some kind of dominance of the claims or rights of certain players in the payoff allocation above that of others. For example, in the river games as discussed in Example 3.2, an upstream player i is necessary for one of its downstream players j, if j and all players between i and j have zero water inflow. So, all the water that reaches j must pass through i. This clearly gives some dominance of i over its downstream player j. Taking the order D from upstream to downstream, structural monotonicity requires that the share of player i in any of the dividends of coalitions containing i and j (these dividends are generated by the benefit that player j or any player downstream of j can derive from water that must pass through i) is at least as high as the share of j. This is in line with the principle of Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (ATS) which favors upstream agents over downstream agents, and can be interpreted as saying that upstream agents should earn at least as much from the gain of cooperation as downstream agents.
On the other hand, a player j downstream of i is necessary to generate payoff from an inflow at i if i and all players between i and j derive no benefit from water. Taking the reverse order from downstream to upstream, structural monotonicity requires that in this case the share of player j in any of the dividends of coalitions containing i and j is at least as high as the share of i. This is in line with the principle of Unlimited Territorial Integrity (UTI) which favors downstream agents over upstream agents, and can be interpreted as saying that downstream agents should earn at least as much from the gain of cooperation as upstream agents. Note that ATS and UTI can be incompatible, and therefore lead to different solutions. Structural monotonicity is a possible formalization of both principles, depending on the chosen order.
Lemma 4.1 If i is necessary for j in
Proof. Suppose that i is necessary for j in v ∈ G N + , and consider T ⊆ N \ {i} with j ∈ T .
The next theorem characterizes the Harsanyi constrained core solution on the class of totally positive games with ordered players as the maximal (with respect to set inclusion) solution that satisfies the five axioms mentioned above. 
D).
Then there is a p
We consider four cases.
By HC satisfying additivity we have that
, the null player property implies that x i = 0 for all i ∈ N \ T , and efficiency implies that ∑ i∈T x i = ∆ v (T ). With nonnegativity it follows that x i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ T . Since i, j ∈ T are necessary for each other in u T , structural monotonicity implies that
Finally, additivity of F and HC implies that , and structural monotonicity requires unanimity symmetry (i.e., in a unanimity game all players of the unanimity coalition earn the same). Then we obtain a well-known characterization of the Shapley value for totally positive TU-games. Notice that in this case the nonnegativity axiom (although satisfied by the Shapley value) is superfluous in the characterization. Summarizing we have the following corollary for TU-games. 
Characterization of the selectope constrained core
The selectope constrained core solution also satisfies the five axioms of Theorem 4. (ii) it follows that for any acyclic digraph, the 7 Here we should redefine efficiency, the null player property, additivity and nonnegativity for TU-games by adapting the corresponding axioms for games with ordered players in a straightforward way. selectope constrained core is always a subset of the Harsanyi constrained core.
8

Corollary 4.4 For every
The selectope constrained core solution also satisfies an alternative structural monotonicity property for a solution F , which requires that a player who has a predecessor that is necessary for him, earns zero payoff. Although the structural monotonicity property and the structural exclusion property do not imply one another 10 , structural exclusion can be seen as a more extreme property. It expresses that the dominance represented by the arcs in the digraph reflect claims or rights of certain players that exclude that of others. For example, for river games, Ambec and Sprumont (2002) 
Proof. (i) The selectope constrained core solution SC satisfying efficiency, the null player property, additivity and nonnegativity follows similar as for the Harsanyi set H for TUgames in G N in Vasil'ev and van der Laan (2002). Further, it follows straightforward that SC satisfies structural exclusion.
8 Note that this also follows immediately since a sharing system assigning zero shares to players that have predecessors in the corresponding coalition satisfies the restrictions of P T D . 9 A similar requirement for simple TU-games is discussed by Napel and Widgrén (2001) . 10 However, a solution that satisfies structural exclusion and nonnegativity also satisfies structural monotonicity.
(ii) Suppose that solution F on G 
Again, the results of Theorem 4.5 also hold on any subclass G
Applications
Rooted trees
In the economic literature one encounters several game models that are restricted totally positive tree games. A game with ordered players (v, D) is called a restricted totally positive tree game when (i) D is a rooted directed tree, and (ii) v is such that coalition T has zero dividend when the subgraph (T, D(T )) is not connected. 11 Although it might look rather extreme, solutions proposed for these economic models often are applications of the selectope constrained core. For a rooted directed tree we say that i is a superior of j (and j a subordinate of i) if there is a directed path from i to j. Define S D (i) as the set of subordinates of i in D. Following Demange (2004) , the so-called hierarchical outcome
it is the payoff vector that allocates the dividend of every connected coalition fully to the (unique) player i that is 'closest' to the root in the sense that i is on the path from the root to every other player in the coalition. Since the dividend of every unconnected coalition is zero when (v, D) is a restricted totally positive tree game, it follows that h(v, D) is the unique element of the selectope constrained core. Moreover, it is an extreme point of the Harsanyi constrained core (the straightforward proof of this is left to the reader). Since all games in the examples 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 are restricted totally positive tree games, the unique elements of their selectope constrained core given in Example 3.7 also are their hierarchical outcomes on the corresponding orders. 
Polluted river games
Consider the pollution river cost allocation problem, shortly polluted river problem, as introduced by Ni and Wang (2007) , and illustrated in Example 3.3. In general, such a polluted river problem is given by a pair (N, c) , i = 1, . . . , n. The LRS outcome reflects that each agent is responsible for its own cleaning costs, while the UES outcome reflects that upstream agents are held responsible for downstream pollution and thus that every agent upstream of some agent i should share in the pollution costs of agent i. Ni and Wang (2007) also associate two TU-games to the polluted river problem. The first one is the so-called LR polluted river game (N, v) given by v(S) = ∑ i∈S c i , S ⊆ N , and the second one, which is already mentioned in Example 3.3, is the so-called DR polluted river game (N, v) given by v(S) = ∑ n i=min S c i , S ⊆ N . It is obvious that the LR polluted river game v is an additive or inessential game, i.e., the worth of any coalition is equal to the sum of the worths of the individuals of the coalition. Hence, core(v) = {c}, and every zero-independent solution assigns this unique core allocation to such an additive game. Further, the dividend of every coalition {i} is c i and all other dividends are zero. Hence v is a totally positive game and
This also holds for the selectope constrained core for any acyclic D.
In the DR polluted river game v the worth of a coalition S is equal to the sum of all costs from the most upstream player in S to the most downstream player n. In fact, v is the airport game corresponding to the airport situation with costs ∑ n j=i c j for player (airplane) i ∈ N , see Littlechild and Owen (1973) . 13 In general an airport game, and so v, is not totally positive. However the dual game w of v is given by Brânzei et al. (2002) , and thus is totally positive. Note that the dual DR polluted game w has the 'dual' interpretation that player i can not be forced to clean up its own territory without the cooperation of its upstream players. Since the Shapley value of a game is equal to the Shapley value of its dual game (see Kalai and Samet (1987) It can be shown that Theorem 4.2 also applies if we restrict ourselves to the class of DR polluted river games. Alternatively, the axioms can be stated directly on the polluted river cost allocation problem which we do informally. Efficiency states that the total cost ∑ n i=1 c i is allocated over the players. Additivity states that the solution outcome of the polluted river cost allocation problem that is obtained by adding two cost vectors, equals the sum of the solution outcomes of these two separate cost allocation problems.
14 Since an agent is a null player in game w if and only if he and all his downstream players have zero cleaning cost, the null player property states that such an agent has to pay zero. Structural monotonicity on the order D − states that a player pays at least as much as its upstream players in case these upstream players have cost zero. It can be shown that the Harsanyi constrained core for polluted river games satisfies these axioms and, moreover every solution satisfying these axioms assigns to every polluted river cost allocation problem a subset of this Harsanyi constrained core. 15 Similar, Theorem 4.5 holds on the class of DR polluted river games, where structural exclusion on the order D − states that a player pays zero if its own and all its upstream players cleaning cost is zero. We conclude this section with the observation that the dual DR polluted river game w is the restricted game of the LR polluted river game v on the permission (digraph) structure D = {(i, i + 1) | i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}}. Gilles et al. (1992) refer to a pair (v, D) as a game with a permission structure. The permission structure restricts the cooperation possibilities of players in the sense that a coalition is feasible if and only if for every player in the coalition all its predecessors also belong to the coalition. The restricted game assigns to every coalition the worth of its largest (with respect to set inclusion) feasible subset. The so-called conjunctive permission value assigns to every game v with permission structure D the Shapley value of the corresponding restricted game and is axiomatized in van den Brink and Gilles (1996) . Since the dual DR polluted river game w is the restricted game of the LR polluted game v on the ordering D, the UES sharing method of Ni and Wang (2007) assigning to each polluted river problem (N, c) the Shapley value of w, equals the conjunctive permission value of (v, D).
As a final remark we notice a fundamental difference between this paper and the literature on games with a permission structure. In the latter models it is assumed that players need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate within a coalition, and thus the restricted game is obtained by restricting the cooperation possibilities. In this sense these models fall within the theory on restricted cooperation. Consequently, for totally positive games the core of the restricted game contains the core of the unrestricted game. In the approach followed in the underlying paper, we restrict the payoff distributions, and thus the Harsanyi and selectope constrained cores are refinements of the core in the sense that they are a subset of the core of the unrestricted game.
